Voting Against Counts Just as Much as Voting For

A look into the 2024 French elections.

By Wong Rui Yik and Isaac Sim

Preface: The authors of this article have written this article in the aftermath of the French election results. We have appended the original article below to represent our views prior to the elections.

French National Assembly final results:

(Round 2)

Total seat count: 577 seats (289 seats required for a majority)

Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s New Popular Front (NFP): 188 seats (26.3% of votes, 57 seat gain)

Macron’s Ensemble (ENS): 161 seats (24.7% of votes, 76 seat loss)

Marine Le Pen’s National Rally: 142 seats (37.1% of votes, 53 seats gain)

Result: No party has attained a clear majority—incumbent Ensemble PM Gabriel Attal has offered his resignation.

(Round 1)

Number of Triangulaires: 306 (2022: 8)

Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN): 33% of popular vote, winning 38 seats outright (1st place in 51% of constituencies)

Left-wing New Popular Front (NPF): 28% of popular vote, winning 32 seats outright (1st place in 26% of constituencies)

Macron’s Centrist Ensemble Alliance: 21% of popular vote, winning 2 seats outright (1st place in 10% of constituencies)

Voter turnout: 67% (highest turnout since 1986)

Predicted Results, as of 3 July 2024 (as per the Economist)

Total Seat Count: 577 (289 required to form a majority)

Marine Le Pen’s Right-wing National Rally (RN): 230-280 

Left-wing New Popular Front (NPF): 125-165

Macron’s Centrist Ensemble Alliance: 70-100

Macron has heaved a sigh of relief. The unprecedented success of the NPF-Ensemble collaboration (frequently termed the “Republican Front”) in the 2nd round, left long-time rival Marine Le Pen's National Rally with less than a quarter of seats in the National assembly; a disappointing performance considering they were aiming to secure a majority of seats in many pre-election polls—a far cry for their final result: placing third place, with even Macron’s ever-unpopular Ensemble alliance placing higher than the National Rally. As much as the far right was damaged, the question still stands as to how much Macron stands to benefit from this result. With his Ensemble alliance taking a staggering 86 seat loss, and the popular vote still favoring the far-right by over 12 points, the odds are stacked against the crumbling centrist dreams of the French president.

But La Pen’s loss is through no fault of her own, and both the ENS and NFP’s victory was earned without either party attaining the highest amount of votes, begging the question: does this result represent the popular will of the French?

An introduction to France’s electoral system:

France’s electoral system is an amalgamation of 2 conventionally-opposing voting systems: first-past-the-post, and proportional representation. France’s round 1 voting requires 50% of the total vote to be won by a single party to be won outright. In round 2, the top 2 parties and any other party which attains 12.5% of the vote will proceed onto first-past-the-post voting, requiring a plurality rather than a majority to secure a victory. Constituencies with more than 2 parties in contention in round 2 voting are considered “triangulaires”. This has resulted in a hyperfixation towards tactical voting within the French electorate, with a dangerous catch—should a majority of voters be heavily opposed against a party, they can heavily diminish their proportion in parliament regardless of their degree of public support: a fate which befell the National Rally. 

In a targeted approach against the far-right, NFP—ironically referred to as being as equally unfit to government as the far-right National Rally by Macron—and Ensemble candidates who ranked third in round 1 withdrew from the second round of voting, throwing their support behind their Republican Front counterpart to prevent vote-splitting, hence increasing the odds of a non-National Rally victory. 

Though his party might have remained in tenuous relevance for now, some have questioned just how democratic Macron’s coalition war with the NFP against the far-right has been. In a system of democracy, it seems somewhat intuitive that the party with the highest number of votes should concomitantly win the most number of seats. The RN, despite acquiring the highest number of votes—that is, 37.1% of votes—have found themselves in 3rd place by virtue of the front’s tactical withdrawal. Does this represent a tyranny of the majority? For reference, the UK’s Labour Party attained even fewer votes (34%), but still attained 63% of seats in the Commons. Such a system also promotes centrist parties, as voters from parties disqualified in Round One voting are more likely to vote for Macron’s centrist Ensemble alliance than a party on the other end of the political spectrum. This has defied all predictions—almost all polls predicted that National Rally would attain the highest seat share in the National Assembly.

When considering if such a system violates the popular will, it may be insightful to turn to the foundations of democracy. Though the RN may have received the most number of votes for, they did—in effect—also receive the most number of votes against. After all, if the governed is free to choose government, is it so radical that they be conferred the capacity to free themselves from those they do not see fit to rule? The basis for democracy is founded most often in popular sovereignty, and popular sovereignty asks not for the favoritism of the people, but rather their consent. A vote against is equally valid to a vote for.

Nevertheless, with an eroded support base and the inexorable march of the far right showing no sign slowing, the light of success is growing ever so dimmer for Macron. How much longer will the far-right tolerate a system that is, by nature, opposed to extremist parties? In what will likely be the highest stakes gamble democracy has seen, Macron’s gamble may yield two extreme results: the best-case scenario in his long-term gamble with democracy ends with him remaining in office past 2027. The worst-case-scenario might be the death of the centrist movement in France—if not in 2024, perhaps in 2027. 

From now on, the bomb will never stop ticking for Macron. 

Appendix A: France Elections: Going All In

Written July 3rd, 2024.

By Isaac Sim 

Macron has gone all in. After suffering heavy losses at the European Parliament elections and the crescendo of a burgeoning far right movement: the French president, battered and bruised, has chosen to bet the last of his political wealth — control over the National Assembly—on a Hail Mary. 

On the 9th of June, Macron dissolved the national assembly, the lower house of the French legislative branch. To say this decision was unprecedented, would be a categorical understatement. In the aftermath of the announcement, flabbergasted reactions came swiftly from all sides of the political spectrum. Even his own prime minister and party members heard the news mere hours before the public, many of whom cast doubt on his decision. After all, in the words of Marine Le Pen, leader of France’s far right National Rally, “When your opponent is riding a wave of support, the last thing you do is encourage that wave.” (Le Monde 2024)

It is clear from Macron’s statements following the dissolution—warning of “civil war” should people vote for his competitors—that he had hoped the elections would shape up to be similar to his 2022 presidential campaign: uniting a strong centrist front to do battle with the dreaded far right.

Unfortunately for Macron, the results from the first round of voting indicate that his gamble is unlikely to play out in his favour, at least in the short term. Increasing political polarisation in France has proven antithetical to his traditional centrist politics, with voters flocking to both extremes, and the left wing NPF outshining Macron’s Ensemble in the polls. Meanwhile, Macron’s tenuous governance over the past 2 years, including forcing unpopular bills through parliament in what has been labeled undemocratic maneuvers (that is, through France’s Article 49.3 mechanism, practically turning the passage of a bill into a confidence question in government), have all but ossified doubts regarding his party’s capacity to rule.

However, not all hope is lost for Macron. For one, it is currently predicted that the National Rally is highly unlikely to form a majority in the legislative in the face of a tri-polarised election. Even the most lenient estimates have the far right falling just short of securing the required 289 seats. Furthermore, Macron could be taking notes from nations like the UK - where ineffective governance and the label of change has single handedly swayed voters. Even if the National Rally secures a majority, should the reign of the right end in a death spiral for France, it is likely Macron would be getting a boost at the 2027 presidential elections. 

Nevertheless, with an eroded support base and the inexorable march of the far right showing no sign slowing, the light of success is growing ever so dimmer for Macron, in what will likely be the highest stakes gamble democracy has seen. The best-case scenario in his long-term gamble with democracy ends with him remaining in office past 2027. The worst-case-scenario might be the death of the centrist movement in France.

Bibliography

Kirby, Paul. “Ugly Campaign Ends and France Draws Breath before Election.” Bbc.com. BBC News, July 5, 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1wenlvn55lo.

———. “What Just Happened in France’s Shock Election?” Bbc.com. BBC News, July 8, 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c724nnn29keo.

The Economist. “France Election Poll Tracker: Will Le Pen’s National Rally Beat Macron’s Alliance?,” n.d. https://www.economist.com/interactive/france-elections-2024-polls-macron-le-pen.